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GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TORTS
IN MINNESOTA*
By
H. ToRTs

W

ORVILLE C. PETERSONf
INVOLVING MIXED

FuNCTIoNs

the complexity of modem municipal government, there
are numerous cases when action by municipal authorities
cannot be simply classified as "governmental" or "proprietary."
Many actions have a dual nature, and in such instances theoretical
difficulties in determining liability for negligence are amplified.
For example, a municipal water supply system, classified for
purposes of tort liability as a proprietary function, serves the
city as well as private consumers. It furnishes water to fight
fires, to sprinkle streets, to sprinkle park grass, and to fill
municipal swimming pools. A municipal electric distribution system not only furnishes light to domestic consumers, but it lights
municipal buildings, streets and recreational fields of the city and
furnishes current to operate fire alarm systems and traffic signals.
In these and many other cases, this dual nature of municipal
action demonstrates in striking fashion the difficulty of rationalizing and applying the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions in the determination of municipal liability for
its torts. "Yet the fact that action can be considered both proprietary and governmental has given our court much less difficulty than might have been expected because in such cases the
court has exhibited an almost invariable tendency to impose
liability. Perhaps this is a reflection of dissatisfaction with the
immunity doctrine which, too well settled to permit judicial
abrogation, can be mitigated in effect in these cases by leaning
heavily on the proprietary nature of the action or non-action which
has resulted in injury.
When the court has been able to construe negligence as the
failure to keep streets in a safe condition for travel, it has
ordinarily done so although other functions might be involved.
When a municipal corporation closes off a street with a rope or
ITH

*Continued from 26 MINNFSOTA LAw RE vIEw 358 and 480. Views expressed in this study are the author's and not those of the League of
Minnesota Municipalities, with which he is associated.
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similar barrier as a means of controlling traffic, a governmental
function, it may be liable for negligence in the maintenance of
its streets;"-, and it is no defense that the barrier was placed
in the street by a policeman.
"The nature of the act, rather than the official title or character of the officer to whom the duty of caring for and attending to
the public streets, or exercising duties thereon conflicting with the
right to use the same determines the liability." '48
A case which indicates the extreme to which the court sometimes has gone in relying upon a breach of the duty to keep
streets safe for travel as a justification for the imposition of
liability even though the negligence causing injury was an act of
the police department in its effort to regulate traffic, is Fitzgerald
v. Village of Bovey, 49 involving a collision with a "dunmy
policeman." The village of Bovey had placed a cone-shaped dummy
policeman at the center of an intersection. About eighteen inches
in diameter and six inches high, it extended somewhat more to
one side of the center than to the other. An automobile being
driven at night over the street on which this traffic control
device was placed struck the dummy with its left front wheel and
was diverted into a ditch against a telephone pole. In affirming
judgments for the plaintiffs on the verdicts for the resulting
injuries, the court found ample evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that under the circumstances the defendant was negligent in putting the dummy where it was. The liability was placed
squarely on the fact that the municipality is given exclusive control of the streets and has the duty of exercising reasonable care
in keeping them in safe condition. Although the defendant contended that as the council determined to install such a marker as
a practical means of assisting the traveling public and that other
municipalities had done the same thing, the court said that what
was proved was not conclusive that the installation of the dummy
policeman was proper since there was no evidence that other
municipalities had installed and maintained such markers or that
such markers were practical, proper or necessary. While there
647Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1904) 93 Minn. 118, 100 N. W.
669; Ihlen v. Village of Edgerton, (1918) 140 Minn. 322, 168 N. W. 12.
It is not, however, negligent as a matter of law in doing so. Petrich v.
Village of Chisholm, (1930) 180 Minn. 407, 231 N. W. 14.
n48Kleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1904) 93 Minn. 118, 120, 100
N. W. 669.
r49(1928) 174 Minn. 450, 219 N. W. 774.
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was disagreement on this point of negligence,650 the court seemed
agreed that what was involved was an alleged breach of the duty
of keeping streets in safe condition for travel. Evidently applying the rule that the nature of the act is the significant thing, the
court appeared to find the fact that the dummy was placed in the
street in the exercise of the governmental function of traffic regulation of no significance. While, assuming negligence, the court's
conclusion is consistent with that reached in most of the cases in
which a governmental function has been involved in addition to
the exceptionally-considered street function, it differs in its
conclusion from a more recent case decided by another court'"
under somewhat similar circumstances. The plaintiff in that case
had been hit by an automobile which had been deflected from its
course because of a collision with an ellipsoidal traffic button
about four inches in height, placed in the street by the city as a
marker for a safety zone. A decision for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal on the ground that the placing of a button
in a street was in performance of a governmental function in
connection with the control of traffic. 5 2
The same tendency toward holding the municipal corporation
liable is demonstrated in the cases involving a defective condition of the street occasioned by some action of the city in its
fire protection services. In the leading case on this point, Hillstrom v. City of St. Paui,,65 a pole erected in one of the
streets of the city and used solely for supporting wires and an
alarm box used as part of the fire alarm system belonging to the
city fire department, had fallen because it was rotten. The cross
bar struck and killed the plaintiff's son. The rule stated in that
case in holding for the plaintiff is the key to most of the dualcapacity cases in which street defects have been involved:
"If the city permits the dangerous condition to continue after
it knew, or ought to have known, of its existence and after it has
had a reasonable opportunity to protect the public from the danger,
the city cannot excuse its failure to perform its duty of keeping
6
SOJustice Stone dissented. "My error, if any, is in my premise that it
is a matter of common knowledge that the dummy so-called, .

.

. is sub-

stantially the same as those used in cities and villages everywhere for the
purposes of guiding traffic. If that be true, defendant could not have been
negligent."
65
Blackburn v. City of St. Louis, (1938)

343 Mo. 301, 121 S. W.
2d. 727. Other cases on both sides are cited in (1939) 23 Marq. L. Rev.
216; 52
(1939) 11 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 128.

For a discussion of the liability of a municipal corporation for a
defective traffic signal, see (1937) 21 .MINKZESOTA Law REv"Ew 459.
653(1916) 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076; see (1917) 1 Mlrx.sorA
LAW

RmIEW 188.
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its streets safe. and relieve itself from liability for such omission,
by showing that the dangerous condition of the street resulted
from acts done in the performance of another governmental duty.
notwithstanding the fact that it is not liable for negligence in the
performance of such other governmental duty. '" ' 4That rule has led to liability in cases where a defective condition of the street was created from water used in fighting fires.05 5
In one such case the plaintiff was denied recovery, 0 , but that
case is readily distinguishable because the alleged defect was a
mere slippery condition, which it is clear a city can ordinarily
T
permit to exist without subjecting itself to liability.0,
The city has also been held liable where the function

of

preservation of health and the duty to maintain streets have been
concurrently involved in negligence cases. Thus in McLeod v.

City of Duluth,"" where the plaintiff was injured through the
negligence of a street flushing crew of the city, the city was held
liable. The court drew a distinction between cases where flushing
of a street is authorized and done solely for the comfort and
health of the general public and where it is not done primarily in
the interest and promotion of the public health but in the discharge
of the general duty of caring for the street even though it is
incidentally beneficial to the public health. Only in the former
cases would the municipal corporation be exempt from liability.
After examining the Duluth charter provisions, the court concluded that in that case flushing was to keep the street in a safe
condition for travel and not primarily for public health. " "'
54
G The decision in Hillstrom v. City of St. Paul is to be differentiated
from that in Howard v. City of Stillwater, (1927) 171 Minn. 391, 21,1
N. IV. 656, where the plaintiff was refused recovery for an injury sustained when, with the permission of the chief of the fire department, he
climbed a street car company pole to repair a city fire alarm wire which
had broken and fallen to the ground because of the city's negligence. Immunity was granted because the city was engaged in a governmental function in maintaining the fire alarm system. It was held that the plaintiff
could not charge the city with liability under the rule that the city is
bound to use ordinary care to maintain its streets in reasonably safe condition. It is to be noticed here that the unsafe condition of the streets, if
any, in having the alarm wire upon it, was not the cause of the accident.
6
05Nichols v. City of Minneapolis. (1885) 33 Minn. 430, 23 N. W.
868; Stoker
v. City of Minneapolis, (1884) 32 Minn. 478, 21 N. W. 557.
6-6Henkes v. City of Minneapolis, (1890) 42 Minn. 530, 44 N. W.
1026. 5
C 7But cf. Nichols v. Village of Buhl, (1922) 152 Minn. 494. 189
N. W. 407. 193 N. W. 28 and Roberts v. Village of Buhil. (1924) 160
Minn.. 398, 200 N. W. 354.
658(1928) 174 Minn. 184, 218 N. W. 892.
65
1t is not likely that the conclusion would be any different under
most other home rule charters.
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Liabiliy..has also been imposed where a city maintained or
permitted the maintenance of a garbage and refuse deposit at
the end of a street in such a way that it looked like a prolongation of the street. 66 0 No attention was given to the fact that the
disposal of garbage was a health function, but the conclusion is
nevertheless consistent with the rule of Hillstrom v. City of
St. PacL
Where parks and street maintenance have been involved, the
court has held to the same line. Parkways or other streets in
parks have been placed in the same category as other streets ;16
and municipal corporations have been held liable for street defects even where the injury for which redress is sought occurs
while the street is being used for play.66 2- In Ackeret v. City of
Minneapolis, the leading case involving parlvays, the court recognized the fact that there was no logical distinction, as respects
tort liability, .between parks and streets but since one had actually
been made, it placed parkvays within the category of streets
rather than parks for purposes of tort liability. It said :603
"On examining the grounds upon which liability is imposed for
defects in streets, we find that the same grounds exist for imposing liability for defects in ihe walks and pathways in question.
These walks and pathways were used not merely for purposes of
pleasure and recreation, but as thoroughfares for passing from
one part of the city to another. They differed from other walks
provided by the city for the use of pedestrians only in the fact
that they were within the limits of a park. We find no substantial
distinction between such walks and those located along the
public streets."
Conceivably, the rule as to the non-liability of a municipality
for damages resulting from its negligence in maintaining a park
might be applied to a case of injury sustained on a path which
bad no connection with the municipal street system or which was
not used in passing from one part of a municipality to another.
However, this is an extremely unusual situation even if the court
were to make a distinction between ordinary parkways and such
paths.
In the case of municipal corporations, liability attaches where
66 0
Ray v. City of St. Paul, (1889) 40 Minn. 458, 42 N. W. 297. Cf.
Dehanitz v. City of St. Paul, (1898) 73 Minn. 385, 76 N. NV. 48.
66o-lleopfert v. City of Minneapolis, (1904) 90 Minn. 158, 95 N.
908; Ackeret v. City of Minneapolis, (1915), 129 Minn. 190, 151 N.
976; Nelson v. City of Duluth, (1927) 172 Minn. 76, 214 N. V. 774.
662
Barrett v. Village of Princeton, (1916) 135 Minn. 56, 160 N.
190. 663
Ackeret v. City of Minneapolis, (1915) 129 Minn. 190, 195,
N. W. 976.

W.
W.
W.
151
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the negligence can be associated with the duty to maintain streets
in good repair, but it may not be imposed if the negligence occurs
only in the discharge of another governmental function. In the
case of quasi-municipal corporations, however, the situation is
quite different because of the immunity of towns and counties from
liability for damages arising out of their failure to keep their
roads in good repair. It might be expected that if the tendency
is to hold the political subdivision liable for its torts whenever
possible, a quasi municipal corporation would be required to
answer in damages where negligence in the maintenance of a
road is coupled with negligence in carrying on a proprietary
function for which liability is imposed. The only case in which
this question has been presented seems to indicate that this will
be the case in practice. Storti v. Town of FayaI661 presented the
court with a situation converse to that involved in Hillstrom v.
City of St. Paul.665 In the Storti Case a town telephone wire
fell down, and the plaintiff, while a traveler on the state trunk
highway, was caught by the wire and injured. As has been seen,
neither the town nor the state would have been liable because
of the defect in the highway. In the Hillstrom Case, the city
would not have been liable had the defect been solely in the
maintenance of the fire alarm system. The court held the defendant
liable in both cases, in the township case on the ground that
the defendant was negligent in carrying on a proprietary function. the telephone system, and in .the city case on the ground
that the defendant was negligent in the maintenance of its streets.
The conclusion from these two cases, largely borne out in other
cases, seems almost inescapable that if an injury occurs through
the acts or omissions of municipal authorities in carrying on two
functions, for the negligence of which the municipality is liable
in only one cAse, liability will be imposed if reasonably possible.
In only one situation has the court found no liability in the
case of dual functions when it might have given relief to the
injured plaintiff by finding that there had been a breach of the
duty to keep the streets in a safe condition for travel. It has been
pointed out earlier that no liability is incurred by failing to light
streets. 6 6 Vhere that question has been presented the plaintiff
664(1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
6s(1916) 134 Minn. 451, 159 N. W. 1076.
66OMiller v. City of St. Paul, (1888) 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. W. 271:
Bojko v. City of Minneapolis, (1923) 154 Minn. 167, 191 N. W. 399; Freeman v. Village of Hibbing. (1926) 169 Minn. 353. 211 N. W. 819; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d ed. rev. 1936), sec. 2816.
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has usually urged that a dark street was a street unsafe for
travel. A holding to that !effect might not have been inconsistent
with such decisions as the police and fire cases, as Hillstrom v.
City of St. Paul, for example, discussed previously in this chapter, but the court has not countenanced the argument. However,
the court has pointed out that .since a street which is partially
out of repair or obstructed may be safe if lighted but dangerous
if not, the fact that it was or was not lighted may be material
66 7
on the question of negligence.
Where a municipal utility and some governmental activity
have both been involved in the same act, the same tendency toward
liability is apparent as in the street cases, but the conclusions
reached have not been uniformly against the municipal corporation. In Brantman v. City of Canby6 s the city was held liable for
damages due to a gas leak although there was some evidence that
the leak was in the pipes furnishing gas for street lighting, a governmental function ;169 and in Keevrer v. City of Mankao,6 1'
where the city was held liable for damages resulting from the
negligent pollution of the water supplied domestic consumers,
the court said that the fact that a portion of the water was used
by the city for protection against fire and in promoting the public health did not absolve it from liability. The court took the same
view in the town telephone case. 67 1 Liability was imposed in
spite of the fact that according to the terms of the enabling
statute, the system was authorized for fire prevention, public
welfare, health and safety and facilitating the work of public im72 provements, rentals being permitted incidentally.
667Miller v. City of St. Paul, (1888) 38 Minn. 134, 36 N. \V. 271.
However, the Hillstrom Case would undoubtedly be followed where an
injury occurred to a pedestrian as a result of a defective pole used solely
for street lighting. A recent Michigan case has held the city liable in such
a situation. Rufuer v%Traverse City, (Mich. 1941) 295 N. AV. 620.
668(1912)
119 Minn. 396, 138 N. W. 671.
669
The Wisconsin supreme court has recently taken the same attitude.
In Christian v. City of New London, (1940) 234 Wis. 123, 290 N. W. 621,
it held that a city which operated a municipal electric distribution system
which supplied public as well as'private needs was not engaged in a governmental function when supplying power for the street lighting system so as
to escape liability for the death of a boy who came in contact with a live
wire of the street lighting system.
670(1910) 113 Minn. 55, 129 N. W. 158, 775.
671
Storti v. Town of Fayal, (1935) 194 Minn. 628, 261 N. W. 463.
672
The decision has been criticized: "It would seem that if the dominant
purpose was to serve a governmental need, an incidental private purpose,
and profit therefrom used in furtherance of the public purpose, should not
have destroyed the towvn's immunity." Seasongood, Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, (1936) 22 Va. L. Rev. 910. 941. Cf. St.
John v. City of St. Paul, (1929) 179 Minn. 12, 228 N. W. 170.
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Apparently the only case which reached a different conclusion is Miller v. City of Minneapolis.0 7 3 The household goods of
the plaintiff were destroyed by fire when the fire department
could get no water for an hour because the hydrant was clogged.
The court found for the defendant in a suit for the value of the
goods on the ground that in so far as the city maintained its
water plant for use by its fire department in extinguishing fires,
it was performing a governmental function. The case is difficult
to differentiate from Brantman v. City of Canby.0"4 In view of
the later decisions holding consistently against the municipal corporation in cases involving utility operations of a municipality,
the strength of Miller v. City of Minneapolis as a precedent is
probably now open to question.175 However, it has never been expressly overruled or modified.
Reference has been made earlier in this survey070 to the maintenance of the municipal hall as a governmental activity. Accidents in municipal buildings provide a most striking illustration of
the difficulty in which the courts find themselves in trying to
apply the capacity test to determine tort liability. The Minnesota
court has established the general principle that a municipal corporation operates a city hall in its governmental capacity and
is therefore not liable for damages resulting from the negligence
of its employees in its maintenance ;77 but the effect of housing
in the building administrative offices for municipal enterprises
of a proprietary character never has been determined. In at
least one case elsewhere a distinction has been made between the
portion of the hall occupied by these enterprises and those occupied by departments administering governmental functions. In
that case 78 the building was used as a city hall and an opera
673(1898) 75 Minn. 131, 77 N. W. 788.
74But in Brantman v. City of Canby, the court refused to consider
as controlling.
Miller
0 v. City of St. Paul
65Other courts have been divided on the question of municipal liability
due 6to 0defective hydrants. See annotation in 113 A. L. R. 661.

7 Supra, (1942) 26
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O77Snider v. City of St. Paul, (1921) 51 Minn. 466, 53 N. W. 763: see
also Dosdall v. County of Olmsted, (1882) 30 Minn. 96, 14 N. W. 458.
WsPleasants v. Greensboro, (1926) 192 N. C. 820, 135 S. E. 321. The
North Carolina rule may also be the law in other jurisdictions. See Baty
v. City of Binghamton, (1931) 234 App. Div. 157, 254 N. Y. S. 363: Duren
v. City of Binghamton, (1939) 172 Misc. Rep. 580, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 518:
Dineen v. City & County of San Francisco, (1940) 38 Cal. App. (2d) 486.
101 P. (2d) 736; Boyce v. San Diego Union High School District. (Cal.
App. 1931) 1 P. (2d) 1037: Alias v. Borough of Rumson, (1935) 174
N. J. L. 227, 176 Atl. 352: Kelmel v. City of Holyoke, (1932) 280 Mass.
433, 182 N. E. 861. It seems to be the established rule that if a municipality lets a portion of the village or city hall for hire and the person
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house, and liability was made to depend. upon the use the plaintiff
was making of the building at the time of her injury. Since she
went in to pay her taxes, there was no liability. Under such a
doctrine it is a matter for conjecture as to what liability would
be imposed on the municipal corporation if a citizen decided to
pay his water bill and his dog's license fee at the same time, and
was injured in going from the water department to the office
of the city clerk.
In some cases where certain rooms in a city hall or court
house are let for hire, liability has been limited to those persons
who have paid for privileges enjoyed or services rendered.'"
However, in Bell v. City of Pittsburgh,6 0 the supreme court of
Pennsylvania held that the use of a public building partly for
business and partly for governmental purposes charges the municipality with responsibility as though it were maintaining it
throughout in its proprietary capacity.
It is common practice, especially in the smaller cities and
villages, to lease the auditorium of the municipal hall for meetings, dances, movies, and other entertainments. Some of the halls
recently constructed appear to have been built with leasing or
attending an entertainment in the hall is injureI by a defect, the municipality is liable if it has been negligent. Little. v: City of Holyoke, (1900)
177 Mass. 114, 58 N. E. 170, 52 L. R. A. 41; Buchanan v. Town of Barre,
(1894) 66 Vt 129, 28 Atl. 878, 23 L. R. A. 488, 44 Am. St. Rep. 829; see
Bennett v. City of Portland, (1928) 124 Or. 691, 265 Pac. 433. A Georgia
court has held, however, that a municipality permitting the use of its
auditorium for a discussion of rehabilitation loans to be made by the federal
government would not be liable to someone injured while attending the
meeting, since the municipality would be making use -of its hall in such
a case in its governmental capacity. Roberts v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah,
(1936) 54 Ga. App. 375, 188 S. E. 39.
67gBenton v. Boston City Hospital, (1885) 140 Mass. 13, 1 N. E. 836;
see -Boyce v. San Diego Union High School District, (Cal. 1931) 1 P.
(2d) 1037. It has been held likewise in a jurisdiction where public parks
are -considered a governmental function that the maintenance of a part of a
municipal park for profit will not make a city responsible for accidents in
other parts. Bisbing v. Asbury Park, (1910) 80 N. J. L. 416, 78 Ad. 196;
see note, (1911) 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 523. The attorney general of
Minnesota once ruled that if a municipal corporation receives some income
from sit hall and invites people or permits them to come to it for purposes
other than those connected with the government of the municipality, it
would be liable for letting its village hall fall into disrepair. Minn. Op.
Atty. Gen. 1918, No. 51. Under the latter circumstances, the attorney
general said, the municipality is liable "to the same extent and in the same
manner as private corporations and natural persons would be." Some years
later he avoided the real question by ruling that whether or not municipalities are liable for defects in their buildings depends upon whether or
not the buildings are used for proprietary or governmental functions. Minn.
Op. Atty. Gen. 1930, No. 47.
680(1929) 297 Pa. St. 185, 146 At. 567. See note in 64 A. L. R. 1545.
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revenue-producing activities specifically in mind.""' The attitude

of the court toward liability for torts in connection with the use
of a municipal hall for mixed functions may, therefore, become
increasingly important. The more recent precedents in other cases
where both governmental and proprietary functions are involved
suggest that the principle of Bell v. City of Pittsburgh might be
followed here; but if the court were to apply the principle that

incidental charges (and thus incidental revenue) will not result
in abrogating the rule of immunity, the decision of the Snider

Case might be followed even where the hall is used for more than
strictly governmental functions .82
The discussion of this chapter can be climaxed with a brief
mention of City of Winona v. Botzet,0 3 for it illustrates excellently the difficulties presented to the courts in applying the
capacity test in determining tort liability in cases of negligence.
Horses on a bridge had been frightened by the blowing of a
steam whistle on a city waterworks building in order to notify
union men and city employees that quitting time had come. It

was contended that the city was not liable for the resulting injury
because in locating and blowing the whistle the city was exercising one of its governmental powers, the establishment and ntaintenance of its fire department and fire alarm system. However, the
court held, first, that if the whistle had been blown in the exercise
of -the power to protect against fires the city would not be exempt
from liability, since the blowing of the whistle was a public
nuisance when it was done within 100 feet of a bridge and was
unnecessary, and second, that the whistle was not blown by the
city in the exercise of its power to protect its inhabitants against
fire.

8 4

681(1940) 25 Minnesota Municipalities 149 carries a news note to the
effect that the New York Mills village hall, then being built, included, in
addition to the usual council chambers, municipal court room and jail.
quarters for the municipal liquor store, public library and postoffice, a diling

hall, dance floor, kitchen, and bowling alley. Similar halls have been built
even in the very smallest villages. The recently completed village hall at
Storden houses an auditorium, auxiliary room, bowling alleys, movie projection room,
library, and dressing room. (1941) 26 Minnesota Municipalities 494.
62
8 Compare Bell v. City of Pittsburgh with Kelley v. City of Boston,
(1904) 186 Mass. 165, 71 N. E. 299, 66 L. R. A. 429, where the Massachusetts court held that a city is not liable for an injury caused by ice and
snow negligently thrown on the roof of its city hall by men employed by
its superintendent of public buildings if the whole building is used for
municipal purposes, even though a portion is occupied by the water, sewer
and other departments.
63(C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1909) 169 Fed. 321.
68
4For

several good illustrations of similar cases, see Seasongood,

Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, (1936) 22 Va. L. Rev.
910. 939-941. A recent case of interest involving mixed functions is
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I.

TORTS TO WHICH THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DOES NOT APPLY

1. INVASIONS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
What happens when a trespass, nuisance, or other invasion
of an interest in land is committed in the performance of a
governmental function is a collision between the immunity rule,
so thoroughly established in negligence cases in which injuries
to real property are not involved, and the protection from damage
given by the law to private property, epitomized in the constitution in the due process provision and especially the clause forbidding the taking or damaging of private property for public
use without compensation. Since the principle that private property should not -be taken without due process and compensation
is even more firmly established than the rule of immunity in the
performance of governmental functions, there has developed an
exception to the doctrine that a municipality is immune from
liability for torts committed in its governmental capacity. It has
been said that the courts uniformly charge cities with liability
when the injury complained of is the result of a positive trespass to real property or a nuisance created by the acts of its
officers. 68 5 In general, this seems to be true in Minnesota if
the word "nuisance" is used in its more limited and accurate
86
sense of an invasion of interests in the private use of land."
Much of the difficulty in so-called nuisance cases is that in
modern law the term "nuisance" has been extended beyond this
primary meaning of interference with the use and enjoyment
of real property to include invasions of a variety of personal
8
rights.68 7 This extension is recognized by statute in Minnesota.1
As a matter of fact, the term "nuisance" has been used so freely
that it has almost completely lost its connotation as a specific
tort. The confusion in terminology between negligence, nuisance,
Sylvester v. City of Milwaukee, (1941) 236 Wis. 539, 296 N. V. 696, in
which the decision depended on whether the injury occurred as the result
of operation of a drawbridge, a governmental function in Wisconsin. or
of the highway over the bridge.
maintenance
6
zTooke, The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort, (1932) 19
Va. L. Rev. 97, 101, 105.
686
See Restatement, Torts, ch. 40, Introduction; 1 Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 211-212.
68
7See (1936) 19 MI1rNxEsoTA LAW REviEw 249.
6881 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 9580, defines a nuisance as "anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses,
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property."
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and trespass is perhaps most apparent in the case of actions for
damages caused by surface water, but the difficulty encountered
in any attempt to attach proper labels to torts in these categories
is evident in other cases; and any one who studies the decisions,
even casually, finds it difficult to determine where nuisance leaves
off and trespass begins and what the relation is between these
torts and negligence. In one case involving a claim for damages
from the discharge on plaintiff's farm of effluent from the city's
septic tank, 8" the court said, "The question of negligence is not
involved. A nuisance does not rest upon the degree of care used
but rather upon the danger, indecency, or offensiveness existing
or resulting even with the best of care." The court then referred
to the statute 90 to indicate what the elements of a nuisance are.
On the other hand, obstructions, excavations, and other defects
in streets have commonly been called nuisances, and liability has
uniformly been determined in actions involving damages due to
such obstructions by applying the test of the municipality's due
care in keeping its streets in a safe condition for travel. 91 Contrasted with Johnson v. City of Fairmont is Powers v. Village of
Hibbhg 92- in which the court refused to allow the plaintiff
damages suffered when her premises were flooded because of the
backing up of a village sewer during an almost unprecedented
rainfall. The plaintiff claimed damages because of the defendant's
negligence in maintaining the sewer in the condition it was in
for a number of years, trespass in flooding her basement, and
the maintenance of a nuisance in keeping the sewer in this condition. The court construed the trespass allegation as charging the
equivalent of a tort or wrong in characterizing the resulting consequence of the defendant's alleged negligence in maintaining
this sewer, and applied the standard of reasonable care and
68sJohnson v. City of Fairmont, (1933) 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W. 572.
6901 Mason's 1927 Minn.. Stats., sec. 9580.
r9lThese cases have been discussed, therefore, in the section on street
and sidewalk cases rather than here. For a few of the cases where obstructions or excavations have been termed nuisances, see Cleveland v. City of
St. Paul, (1871) 18 Minn. 279 (Gil. 255) ; Moore v. Townsend, (1899) 76
Minn. 64, 78 N. W. 880; Svendsen v. Village of Alden, (1907) 101 Minn.
158, 112 N. W. 10; Fortmeyer v. National Biscuit Co., (1911) 116 Minn.
158, 133 N. W. 461. See also Mueller v. City of Duluth, (1922) 152 Minn.
159, 188 N. W. 205; Mesberg v. City of Duluth, (1934) 191 Minn. 393, 254
N. W. 597; Heidemann v. City of Sleepy Eye, (1935) 195 Minn. 611, 264
N. W. 212; O'Hara v. Morris Fruit & Produce Co., (1938) 203 Minn. 541,
282 N. W. 274.
C92(1930) 182 Minn. 66, 233 N. W. 597.

GOVERNMENTAL RESPONrSIBILITY FOR TORTS

diligence required of the municipality in constructing its sewers." =
As for the nuisance allegation, the court sanctioned and applied
a rule in a New York case 94 that it is necessary to prove negligence in nuisance cases except when the nuisance is the result
of an unauthorized or unlawful and wrongful act. 9 '
In spite of the confusion in terminology, the court has applied
different rules for a nuisance from those used in the cases of
negligence and other torts heretofore considered only where the
tort is a nuisance in the true sense of being an invasion of an interest in the use and enjoyment of property. Where a personal
injury has been involved, the court has applied the usual distinction between governmental and proprietary functions, even
though the pleader has sought to treat the wrohlgful act as a
nuisance or a trespass. Thus in Bojko v. City of 1V1inneapolis G9
recovery was not permitted for damages suffered as a result of
failure to light streets, and the court concluded that it made no
difference "whether the neglect be characterized ...as creating
a nuisance, or as mere negligence." The same point was made in
Mokoaich 2. Independent School District, No. 22,G97 in which the
plaintiff sought damages for injuries suffered when he was
thrown onto a marking line of unslaked lime while playing football for the school. With some courts, an allegation based on
nbisance has been successful in cases like these, involving actions
where recovery on the ground of negligence would have been
precluded;"9s but the Minnesota cases indicate that a mitigation
of the immunity rule cannot be sought in that direction.
693As the court says, "The case of Netzer v. Crookston City. (1894)
59.Minn. 244, 61 N. W. 21, sufficiently points out that where the improvement is lawful and the flooding is caused by some careless act or omission
in maintaining the same, the municipality is required only to exercise
ordinary care, and that the rule applies whether the action be considered
as one for trespass or for negligence. The case of Tate v. City of St. Paul,
(1894) 56 Mlinn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45 Am. St. Rep. 501, is held not in
conflict4 with that rule."
69Uggla v. Brokaw, (1907) 117 App. Div. 586, 102 N. Y. S. 857. 867.
695Cf. Restatement of Torts, sec. 822, as to the elements of liability
for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land. According to the Restatement the invasion must be
either (1) intentional and unreasonable, or (2) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligence, reckless
or ultrahazardous conduct
696(1923) 154 Minn. 167, 191 N. V. 399.
697(1929) 177 Mfinn. 446, 225 N. W. 292.
69
SNote, Inroads upon Municipal Immunity in Tort, (1932) 46 Harv.
*L. Rev. 305, 306, citing particularly Hoffman v. City of Bristol, (1931)
113 Conn. 386, 155 AUt. 499, and Maxwell v. City of Ifiami, (1924) 87 Fla.
107, 100 So. 147; see also MlcCarton v. New York City, (1912) 149 App.
Div. 516, 133 N. Y. S. 939; cf. Adams v.City of Toledo, (1939) 163 Or. 185.
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On the other hand, when the wrongful act complained of
amounts to an invasion of an interest in the use or possession of
land, the municipality which has occasioned the injury has been
held liable uniformly without regard to the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions. The doctrine is thoroughly established that no political subdivision of the state may cause
an invasion of private property through its own use of property,
either directly or indirectly, without being subject to liability
for the resulting damages.699 The municipality has been placed
in exactly the same position as private landowners with respect
to its trespasses upon adjacent lands. The principle has been
extended to apply in situations where it seems difficult to rely
for the conclusion on the constitutional guarantee of compensation for the taking or damaging of property for public use. 00
Newman v. County of St. Louis7" 1 is such a case. In clearing,
opening and improving a county road, St. Louis County employees negligently set fire to certain inflammable brush and refuse
within the road, and the fire spread to the plaintiff's adjacent lands
because it was negligently tended. As a result of this, the plaintiff's buildings were destroyed. Overruling defendant's demurrer
in the plaintiff's action for damages, the court held that liability
of a county is not limited to cases of positive trespass. Since the
county stands in exactly the same position through its possession
of county roads as a private landowner toward other landowners
for damages to adjacent lands caused by acts done in the management and control of the highway, the complaint was held to state
a cause of action.7 °2 Shortly after the Nemnan decision, the court
96 P. (2d) 1078; Shapiro v. City of Chicago, (Ill. App. 1941) 32 N. E.
(2d) 338. A recent case note on the Adams decision, found in (1940) 25
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 115, concludes, "Although the result in the instant
case may be desirable, it would seem that little is gained by calling purely
negligent conduct a nuisance in order to uphold the liability of a municipality."
699
Peters v. Town of Fergus Falls, (1886) 35 Minn. 549, 29 N. W.
596; McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767;
Tate v. City of St. Paul, (1894) 56 Minn. 527, 58 N. W. 158, 45 Am. St.
Rep. 501; Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey, (1917) 136 Minn. 46, 161 N. W.
222; Bohrer v. Village of Inver Grove, (1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207
N. W. 721.
7OOSee the discussion of that provision of the constitution, infra, text
at footnote 1003 et seq.
701(1920) 145 Minn. 129, 176 N. W. 191.
702
The question had been left open in an earlier case. Shute v. Princeton Township, (1894) 58 Minn. 337, 59 N. W. 1050.
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decided that a town would be liable for spreading quack grass on
to land which had previously been free from quack grass.--"
"Municipal and quasi municipal corporations have been liable
for invasions of property -in various situations. Miany of those
cases have been mentioned previously. They have been held liable,
for example, for placing an embankment on private property.70
for trespass on a cemetery lot,"0 5 and for damming a river so as
to overflow private land. 06 A city has been held liable for damages to private buildings caused by blasting on its own property."0
The private nuisance statute0 " in terms makes no distinction between political subdivisions of the state and others, and
the results in cases in which municipal corporations have been
accused of maintaining a nuisance suggest that the court has read
none into the law. The public nuisance statute" 9 apparently is
also applicable to municipal corporations.7 10 although no one can
bring an action because of the maintenance of such a nuisance
unless he suffers special or particular damages arising from the
703
Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, (1922) 153 Minn. 11, 189 N. W\. 439.
This point was dictum in the -case, the holding being that injunction against
hauling dirt containing cfuack grass did not lie.

TO4Nelson v. Village of West Duluth, (1893) 55 Minn. 497, 57
N. W. 149.
7OSacks v. City of Minneapolis, (1898) 75 Minn. 30, 77 N. W. 563.
7
OBoye v. City of Albert Lea, (1898) 74 Minn. 230, 76 N. W. 1131.

7 7

o,Hughes v. City of Duluth, (1938)

204 Minn. 1, 281 N. WV.871.

Injuries to the person were also held compensable in that case, where tle
blasting was in connection with street construction. So far as the building
was concerned, the result would have been the same whether or not the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions had been applied.
As a matter of fact, the only question discussed was the liability of a
municipal corporation for acts of WPA workers engaged on municipal

projects. As to blasting, cf. Nelson v. McKenzie-Hayne Co., (1934) 192
Minn. 180, 256 N. WV.96, where a contractor constructing a highway for
the state was held not liable for blasting damage, the blasting being con-

sidered as a necessary act which would have been a nuisance had it not been
authorized by the state.

No Minnesota case has involved municipal liability for a noise

nuisance on city or village property. See on this point the recent W\isconsin

case of Blake v. City of Madison, (1940) 237 Wis. 498, 297 N. WV.
422.
which held that a municipality may be liable for such a nuisance maintained on its athletic field even though it operates the athletic field in its
governmental capacity.
7081 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 9580.
7091 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stats., sec. 10240, defines a public nuisance
as a crime against the order and economy of the state, consisting in unlawfully doing an act or omitting to perform a duty, which act or omission
(1) annoys, injures, or endangers the safety, health, comfort, or repose of
any considerable number of persons, (2) offends public decency, (3) unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or renders dangerous for passage a lake,
river, or other public water, or a public park or street, or (4) in any
way renders a considerable number of persons insecure in life or the use of
property.
71oSee Mesberg V.City of Duluth, (1934) 191 Minn. 393, 254 N. W. 597.
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nuisance apart from the general injury to the public."' Of course
a public nuisance if it has been
an act or omission is not
7 12 state.
the
by
authorized
Apart from the numerous cases in which street obstructions.
excavations, or other defects have been termed nuisances",'
and those in which casting sewage on private lands or into
streams also has been considered a nuisance,7 14 nuisance cases
involving municipal corporations have not been many, and those
involving quasi municipal corporations have been few indeed.
Usually, the court has taken it for granted that the immunity of
political subdivisions of the state for negligence in the exercise
of governmental functions does not extend to "nuisances" which
do not arise out of or are indistinguishable from negligence; 7 '
and since counties, towns, and school districts have been held
to exercise only governmental functions, 710 the imposition of liability upon these quasi municipal corporations in what have been
considered to be nuisance actions seems to show conclusively that
the liability of political subdivisions of the state for the maintenance of a nuisance in its correct sense is the same as that of a
private individual under the same circumstances. 7" That liability
7
llLong v. City of Minneapolis, (1895) 61 Mim. 46, 63 N. W. 174;
Viebahn v. Board of County Commissioners, (1905) 96 Minn. 276, 104
N. W.2 1089.
71 Nelson v. McKenzie-Hayne Co., (1934) 192 Minn. 180, 256 N. W.
Keil v. City of St. Paul, (1891) 47 Minn, 288, 50 N. W. 83.
96. 7See
1
3See note 691. A bridge obstructing navigation on a river also has
been held to be a public nuisance. Viebahn v. Board of County Commissioners,
(1905) 96 Minn. 276, 104 N. W. 1089.
7 4
1 Batcher v. City of Staples, (1912) 120 Minn. 86, 139 N. W. 140;
Joyce v. Village of Janesville, (1916) 132 Minn. 121, 155 N. W. 1067;
Nienow v. Village of Mapleton, (1919) 144 Minn. 60, 174 N. W. 517;
Hughes v. Village of Nashwauk, (1929) 177 Minn. 547, 225 N. W. 898;
Power v. Village of Hibbing, (1930) 182 Minn. 66, 233 N. W. 597; Johnson v. City of Fairmont, (1933) 188 Minn. 451, 247 N. W. 572; Shuster v.
City of Chisholm, (1938) 203 Minn. 518, 282 N. W. 135. Compare the
recent Wisconsin case of Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, (1940) 234
Wis. 201, 290 N. W. 647, which held that while the operation of a sewage
disposal plant constituted the exercise of a governmental function, the
village was not thereby exempted from liability for maintenance of a
nuisance.
71
SAs in Mokovich v. Ind. School District No. 22, St. Louis County,
(1929) 177 Minn. 446, 225 N. W. 292, where, as has been pointed out, the
court could see no difference in the result whether the tort was called
nuisance or negligence.
71"With the exception, previously noted, of the operation of a telephone
system
in the case of towns.
717
Schussler v. Board of Commissioners of Hennepin County, (1897) 67
Minn. 412, 70 N. W. 6; Viebahn v. Board of County Commissioners of
Crow Wing County, (1905) 96 Minn. 276, 104 N. W. 1089; Bohrer v.
Village of Inver Grove, (1926) 166 Minn. 336, 207 N. W. 721. See also
Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, (1922) 153 Minn. 11, 189 N. W. 439. In the
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for such torts as nuisance is broader than that for negligence
is suggested by Schussler v. Board of Conmnissioners of Henne18
pin County.J
Holding the county liable for damages suffered
by the owner of a grist mill when the county constructed a dam on
a creek above the plaintiff's mill, the court said, 71 9 "This is therefore not a mere act of negligence of the board of county commissioners in the performance of an official duty, but an active and
affirmative tort, done under claim of statutory authority." The
principle that a municipality is liable for damages resulting from
nuisances of its own creation seems to be generally accepted elsewhere- 20
Somewhat akin to these cases, but more limited in application,
are the decisions establishing the principle that one who for his
own profit keeps on his premises anything not naturally belonging there, the natural tendency of which is to become a nuisance
and do mischief if it escapes, is liable if it escapes, without proof
of negligence for all damages thus resulting. -I The doctrine has
been applied to municipal corporations engaged in the business of
distributing water to its inhabitants for profit. --22 Apparently, the
rule of absolute liability Without proof of negligence is not applicable except where the municipality is engaged in a strictly
proprietary venture. - 3
a. INTERFERENCES WITH SURFACE WATER

The rule that a municipal corporation or quasi municipal
corporation is liable for actions resulting in damages to adjacent
lands when a private owner would likewise be liable under the
Schussler Case, there is no mention of nuisance, but that is apparently
the basis of the action. Most of the discussion centers around the ultra
vires character of the act. Cf. Thompson v. County of Polk, (1899) 38

Minn. 130, 36 N. W. 267, in which the court, while holding the county not.
liable for damages due to allegedly negligent ditch construction, specifically pointed out that the injury was not caused by the maintenance of a
nuisance on the property of the county.

718(1897) 67 Minn. 412, 70 N. W. 6.
719(1897) 67 Minn. 412, 416, 70 N. W. 6.
720See cases cited in an annotation in 75 A. L. R. 1196.
2'Cathill v. Eastman, (1872)

18 Minn. 324 (Gil. 324); Berger v.

Minneapolis Gas Light Co., (1895) 60 Minn. 296, 62 N. W. 336.
722
Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, (1906) 99 Minn. 255, 109 N. W. 114:
Bridgeman-Russell Company v. City of Duluth, (1924) 158 Minn. 509, 197
N. W. 971. Damages in the first case resulted from a broken reservoir, in
the second case a broken water main. The court has refused to extend
the doctrine to a mill dam lawfully constructed by a city in a stream.
City Water Power Co. v. City of Fergus Falls, (1910) 113 Minn. 33, 128
N. W. 817.
723Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, (1906) 99 Minn. 255, 109 N. W. 114.
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same circumstances has been most frequently applied in connection with interference with surface waters. These cases are
numerous, and their confusion in the statements of the applicable
legal principles 2 1 is almost as great as their number. In a recent
careful analysis of the cases decided by the courts of the country
in which interferences with surface water have been involved, the
evolution of the Minnesota doctrine of reasonable use has been
lucidly traced. 725 The earliest Minnesota cases professed to follow
the "common enemy" rule. 728 This doctrine, even at first, was
subject to several qualifications. A municipality was subject to
liability for an interference with the flow of surface water resulting unnecessarily in turning destructive currents on other
land, 27 for blocking up the natural flow of surface water through
ravines and casting it in harmful quantities on private property,7 28 and for gathering up surface water through artificial means
and turning it in increased quantities on private lands.1 29 Doubt
had been expressed during the same period about the rule of
O'Brien v. City of St. Paul in cases where municipal corporations were not involved, 2 0 and the original rule was restated in
72 4
The results achieved appear to be more consistent than the principles
stated725to achieve them.
Kinyon and McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, (1940) 24
MINNESOTA Law REVIEW 891, 908-911. The brief history of the Minnesota
rule given
in this study is abstracted in part from that article.
26
,
I.e. Surface water is a common enemy which each landowner has
an unlimited legal privilege to deal with as he pleases, regardless of the
physical damage his action may cause to others. The early cases are cited
in Kinyon and McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, (1940) 24
MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 891, 908 and include the municipal cases of
O'Brien v. City of St. Paul. (1878) 25 Minn. 331. 33 Am. Rev. 470: McClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767; Pye v.
City of Mankato. (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St. Rep. 671
Follman
v. City of Mankato, (1891) 45 Minn. 457, 48 N. W. 192.
727O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 33 Am. Rep. 470.
72
sMcClure v. City of Red Wing, (1881) 28 Minn. 186, 9 N. W. 767.
729Township of Blakey v. Devine, (1886) 36 Minn. 53, 29 N. W. 342;
Pye v. City of Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St. Rep.
671. That principle has been repeatedly applied since. Robbins v. Village
of Willmar, (1898) 71 Minn. 403, 73 N. W. 1097; Gunnerus v. Town of
Spring Prairie, (1904) 91 Minn. 473, 98 N. W. 340, 974; Weber v. City
of Minneapolis, (1916) 132 Minn. 170, 156 N. W. 287. It has been held
to be immaterial that surface water was first discharged upon the defendant's
own land by artificial means as long as the increased and injurious quantity
and volume of the water upon the plaintiff's land was the inevitable result.
Beach v. Gaylord, (1890) 43 Minn. 476, 45 N. W. 1095.
,30 See Hogenson v. St. Paul, Mpls. & Manitoba Ry. Co., (1883) 31
Minn. 224, 226, 17 N. W. 374, where the court said, "The right of an owner
to improve his land for the purpose for which such land is ordinarily used.
and to do it in the ordinary manner, as by building on it, or raising the
surface where necessary to its improvement, even though as an incident to
it the rain and snow waters falling on it may be diffused over adjoining
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considerably modified form in the leading case of Sheehanv v.
Flynn,731 in which a general rule was established to the effect
that one who possessed land might alter the flow of surface water
so long as he used reasonable care 7 2 and did not cause unnecessary or unreasonable harm to others."' The idea of reasonableness
embraced consideration of all the circumstances of the particular
case,734 including the amount of benefit to the one who interfered
7
with the surface water compared to the harm caused to others 3
3
0
and the topography of the land in the vicinity.
The cases since
Sheehan v. Flynn have for the most part looked back to that
famous decision as a precedent, but have veered more and more
toward a complete acceptance of the reasonable use rule, 73- alland, was conceded arguendo in O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25
Minn. 331. Without determining whether that right may not be qualified by
the circumstances of particular cases, we are prepared to say that that is as
far as it is safe to go, and that it does not include the right to gather the
surface waters on one's land and turn them upon the land of another, to
its damage, even though the former land may as a consequence thereof be
improved. In other words, he may not in this way improve his own land,
by merely transferring to the land of another a burden which nature has
imposed on his own land."
731(1894) 59 Minn. 436, 61 N. W. 462, 26 A. L. R. 632.
732
"This is a reasonable doctrine, that takes into consideration all the
circumstances of each case. It gives to each man the common-law right to
improve and enjoy his own property to its fullest extent, but limited by the
requirement that he use reasonable care in disposing of surface water,
which the common law did not always require him to do. When he has
used such reasonable care, he can generally stand on his common-law
rights. ...." Idem, p. 442. The requirement of reasonable care is not, however, part of the reasonable use rule. Bush v. Cits' of Rochester, (1934) 191
Minn. 591, 255 N. WV.256.
733
"The common-law rule as to liability for the diversion of surface
water has been modified in this and other states by the rule that a person
must so use his own as not unnecessarily or unreasonably to injure his
neighbor.' Idem, p. 441.
734See the quotation in note 732 above.
735 Sheehan v. Flynn, (1894) 59 Minn. 436, 441, 61 N. W. 462, 26
L. R. A. 632.
73GIdem, p. 449, especially this passage: "...
if lie would prevent it

(the surface water) from coming upon his land, he must not do so by
obstructing some natural drain, and thereby hold back the water and flood
the land of his neighbor."
73 7
The reasonable use rule was apparently accepted fully in a case
decided shortly after Sheehan v. Flynn. In Gilfillan v. Schmidt, (1896)
64 Minn. 29, 36, 66 N. W. 126, 31 L. R. A. 547, 58 Am. St. Rep. 515,
the court, speaking through Judge Mitchell, said, "No person has the
absolute and unqualified legal right to the use of his own property
unaffected by the reasonable use by his neighbor'of his property. The use
by my neighbor of his property in a particular way may discommode and
injuriously affect me in the.enjoyment of my property; but if his use is a
reasonable one, I must submit to any resulting inconvenience. The question, after all, is really one of reasonable use. .. "
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though the court has not consistently adhered to it.7 - The reasonable use rule was fully accepted in the most recent Minnesota case,
Bush v. City of Rochester,7 30 in which, although it was stated
that the common law doctrine as applied in Sheehan v. Flynn,
is still in force in this state, the rule was asserted in this way :740
"The disposition of surface water must be 'reasonable under
all the circumstances,' and the consequent injury to others must
not be so great, as compared to the benefit derived, as to make it
unreasonable on that account. If a municipality in the improvement
of its streets collects surface waters, it is bound both to care
for the same when reasonably practicable and to l)revent danmage
to-others. This duty is not absolute. Reasonable regard for the
4
rights of others is required so that injury may be prevented.111

1

742

It has been pointed out elsewhere
that the Minnesota cases
have presented this picture of the evolution of the reasonable
use rule: first, the unqualified common enemy rule; then specific
exceptions; then the "qualified" common enemy rule; and finally,
the gradual adoption of the reasonable use principle as the sole
test.7 43 It is clear, however, that the court itself has been aware of
73sSee, for example, Robbins v. Village of Willmar, (1898) 71 Minn.

403, 73 N. W. 1097; Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, (1898) 73 Minn. 347.
76 N. W. 44; Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, (1898) 78 Minn. 275, 80
N. W. 1123; Gunnerus v. Town of Spring Prairie, (1904) 91 Minn. 473.
98 N. W. 340, 974; O'Neill v. City of St. Paul, (1908) 104 Minn. 491, 116
N. W. 114; Weber v. City of Minneapolis, (1916) 132 Minn. 170, 156
N. W. 287; Kieffer v. County of Ramsey, (1918) 140 Minn. 143, 167 N. W.
362; Sandmeier v. Town of St. James, (1925) 165 Minn. 34, 205 N. W.
634. No effort has been made here to collect cases involving interferences
by private individuals with surface water. The important ones are cited
in Kinyon and McClure, Interference with Surface Waters. (1940) 2,4
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 891. 908-911, and a note in (1918) 2 MINNESOTA
LAW REVIEW 449.
739(1934) 191 Minn. 591, 255 N. W. 256.
740(1934) 191 Minn. 591. 593, 255 N. W. 256.
74lThe reasonable use doctrine had been recognized

quite completely
also in Simonson v. Township of Alden, (1930) 181 Minn. 200, 231 N. W.
921 where Judge Dibell, speaking for the court, said, "An upper landowner may discharge surface waters from his lands upon lower lands but
in so doing must proceed reasonably and not so use his own as unneccssarily to damage the property of a lower owner; and lie may not unreasonably gather waters on his lands and cast them upon lower lands in
destructive quantities. The question of what is reasonable depends largely
on the
742 facts in the particular case."
Kinyon and McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, (1940)
24 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
743

891, 935.

Those authors have pointed out that several other states have completed all but the last step in this cycle. As they classify the courts of the
various states, only Minnesota and New Hampshire subscribe to the
reasonable use rule completely. They list 21 states and the District of
Columbia as advocates of the common law rule with numerous qualifications and modifications, and 18 states, also with qualifications and niodifications, as adherents of the civil law rule, which in substance is that one
who interferes with the natural flow of surface waters so as to cause
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no such transition in its concepts, and repeatedly it has professed
to be following the rule of Sheehan v. Flynn.74 4 At any rate,
regardless of the court's statement of what the rule is,-, tile
cases appear .generally to have been decided consistently with
7 46
the rule of reasonable use.

an invasion of another's interests in the use and enjoyment of his land is
subject to liability to the other.
744
Even in Bush v. City of Rochester, (1934) 191 Minn. 591, 255
N. W . 256, this was the court's attitude, as is evidenced by this quotation:
"By the rule of the common law, adhered to by this court, a landowner
may within reason appropriate to his own use or expel from his land all
mere surface water. Surface water is regarded as a common enemy
which each proprietor may fight or rid himself of as he chooses ... *:The
spread and diffusion of ,vater over adjacent land is recognized as a Iecessary consequence of improvement. What is reasonable use is subject to
question and in many cases must be determined by the jury upon the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. In our cases the terms negligence,
. . . trespass, . . . and nuisance . . . are sometimes loosely applied
to the imprbper diversion of surface waters. Even in Sheehan Y. Flynn,
* . . the phrase 'reasonable care' is sometimes used where obviously
'reasonable use' is intended. The common law doctrine as there modified
is still
745 in force in this state." The quotation appears on pp. 592 and 593.
Kinyon and McClure state the reasonable use rule as follows:
"A possessor of land is not unqualifiedly privileged to deal with surface
water as he pleases, nor is he absolutely prohibited from interfering with
the natural flow of surface waters to the detriment of others. Each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even
though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some
harm to others. He incurs liability only when his harmful interference
with the flow of surface water is unreasonable. The issue of reasonableness
or unreasonableness is a question of fact to be determined in each case
upon a consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including such
factors as the amount of harm caused, the foresecability of the harm on
the part of the possessor making the alteration in the flow, the purpose or
motive with which he acted, and others." Kinyon and .McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, (1940) 24 MIfXNEsorA LAw REVirw 891.
904-905.
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Kinyon and McClure found that this was true, to a somewhat
lesser extent, in other states as well, where other rules were being professedly followed. See their article, especially p. 934. The American Law
Institute has adopted this rule in the Restatement of Torts, sec. 833.
Perhaps any attempt to classify the states according to which of three rules
they follow, as Kinyon and McClure have done in their article, must result in some rather arbitrary pigeon-holing; whether they say so or not,
the courts inject an element of the reasonable use concept into the rule they
profess to follow almost every time they establish or apply a new limitation or qualification. Since, as in Minnesota, the courts are not likely to
throw overboard the common law or civil lav rule when they have reached
the stage in which the Minnesota court finds itself now, it is difficult for
anyone to determine when the line between the civil law or the common
law rule and the rule of reasonable use has been crossed by a court.
The subjective nature of classifications of this character is illustrated by the
fact that Farnham in his work on Waters and Water Rights (1904) sec.
889f concludes that the Minnesota cases, in spite of their professed adherence to the common law rule actually apply the rule of the civil law.
See also the note to Sheehan v. Flynn in 26 L. R. A. 632 and the comment
note in (1919) 2 MIrNESOTA LAw Ravmw 449, 453. At any rate it must
be conceded that Kinyon and M£cClure's classification is as good a one as
can be made; certainly their article displays the results of thorough and
painstaking research into the cases.
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It is apparent from the cases which have been cited on surface water interference that quasi municipal corporations are
held to the same degree of accountability as true municipal corporations, 7 and that both are in exactly the same position in
748
this regard as are individuals.
Perhaps a detailed analysis of the cases involving interferences with surface water by political subdivisions of the state
would serve only to confuse, since in their statement of the
principles involved they cannot always be fitted into the same
mold. A few general statements may be helpful, however.
Regardless of the rule the court purports to follow, it would
probably arrive at the conclusion, as it has done, that if the
municipality in its work of improving its streets or public places
interferes with the natural flowage of surface water or fails to take
care of it, it is not liable if the possessor of lower land is no worse
off than before.7 49 In such a case it need not put in any sewerage
system at all, or one adequate to take care of all the water.79 0 It
has even been held that a municipal corporation is not subject
to liability when it has diverted surface waters from natural
ravines, and through storm sewers deposited them in a swamp at
different points from the natural points of discharge.7 1
Whether or not it is an inseparable part of the concept of
reasonable use, necessity frequently has been declared to be a
factor in determining the liability of a governmental unit for interferences with surface water. Frequently this idea has been linked
with reasonableness; if an interference is necessary and reason747See, for example, Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, (1899) 78 Minn.
275. 80 N. W. 1123; Lindstrom v. County of Ramsey, (1917) 136 Minn.
46, 161 N. W. 222; Kieffer v. County of Ramsey, (1918) 140 Minn. 1,13.
167 N.8 W. 362.
74 O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 33 Am. Rep. 470;
Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, (1899) 78 Minn. 275, 80 N. W. 1123.
749O'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1872) 18 Minn. 176; Henderson v. City
of Minneapolis, (1884) 32 Minn. 319, 20 N. W. 322; St. Paul & Duluth R. R.

Co. v. City of Duluth, (1894) 56 Minn. 494, 58 N. W. 159; Dudley v.

Village of Buffalo, (1898) 73 Minn. 347, 76 N. W. 44.
75°Henderson v. City of Minneapolis, (1884) 32 Minn. 319, 20 N. W.
322; 7 Dudley
v. Village of Buffalo, (1898) 73 Minn. 347, 76 N. W. 44.
51
St. Paul & Duluth R. R. Co. v. City of Duluth, (1894) 56 Minn.
494, 58 N. W. 159. It is conceivable that under some circumstances this
might not involve a reasonable use by the municipal corporation of its
property; possibly the same conclusion might not have been reached in
this case after Sheehan v. Flynn, although this does not seem likely. See
Dudley v. Village of Buffalo, (1898) 73 Minn. 347, 76 N. W. 44; Nichols
v. Village of Morristown, (1935) 195 Minn. 621, 263 N. W. 900. In
O'Neill v. City of St. Paul, (1908) 104 Minn. 491, 116 N. W. 114, a
municipal corporation was held not liable where it merely changed the
distribution of the waters which flowed on plaintiff's land.
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able, it does not subject the municipality to liability.7 -1 In other
cases the rules have been stated as if necessity alone were a
defense to an action for damages from the casting of surface
water in harmful quantities on the plaintiff's land.133 Actually,
necessity can at most be considered only one of several factors
bearing on the question of reasonable use; if other methods of
drainage are easily available which would avoid harm to the
plaintiff, the method causing the interference can hardly be considered to be a reasonable use. On the other hand, necessity
alone can scarcely be considered sufficient in ordinary circumstances to justify action which would otherwise subject the
municipality to liability. Yet in Schuett v. City of StitIwater,
the court criticized a charge to the effect that a city, although it
might make any needful arrangements for the disposition of surface water involved in street grading, might not collect surface
water -at a point where it could not naturally go and turn it in
destructive currents upon adjoining land. The court thought the
charge should have been qualified by adding that this was true
only if it could be done practicably and at reasonable expense.""
In the full statement of the reasonable use rule given in Bush V.
City of Roclwster,758 it was said that the city was bound "both
to care for the same when reasonably practicable and to prevent
damage to others," a statement which suggests that while necessity
may dictate that the city undertake the improvement without
taking care of the surface water, it is still subject to liability
if it floods adjoining land. This seems more equitable to the
aggrieved possessor of the flooded land.
If there is an interference with surface waters which amounts
to an unreasonable use of the defendant's land, the question of
negligence should be immaterial. This appears to be the case"I
although even recent cases have used language indicating that
752 Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, (1899)

78 'Minn. 275, 80 N. W.

1123; Koeper v. Town of Louisville, (1908) 106 Mfinn. 269, 118 N. W.
1025; Simonson v. Township of Alden, (1930) 181 'Minn. 200. 231 N. W.
921. Sheehan v. Flynn seems to be the origin for this statement.
7530'Brien v. City of St. Paul, (1878) 25 Minn. 331, 33 Am. Rep. 470;
Pye v. City of Mankato, (1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St.
Rep. 671; Kieffer v. County of Ramsey, (1916) 140 'inn. 143. 167 N. V.

362. It will be noticed that the last case was decided considerably after

Sheehan v. Flynn.
754(1900) 80 Minn. 287, 83.N. W. 180.
755
The court added that this qualification was especially important
where the surface of the ground was rough and hilly as was that involved

in the Stillwater case.
756(1934) 191 Minn. 591, 255 N. W. 256.

-57 Kieffer v. County of Ramsey, (1918) 140 Minn. 143. 167 N. W. 362.
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the standard of reasonable care was to be applied to the municipality's action.7' The explanation for the reference to the negligence concept perhaps may be found in the statement in the early
case of Pye v. City of Mankato' 59 that "Having attempted to
conduct the natural flow in another direction by an artificial
channel, the city had to use reasonable care to do this so as not
to cause a positive trespass. Not to do so was negligence." What
the court seems to have had in mind is that if the municipality
had used reasonable care, no invasion would have been caused and
consequently there could have been no liability. On the other
hand if the municipality had unreasonably diverted surface water
on to the plaintiff's land, the absence of negligence should have
made no difference.
The construction of ditches under the drainage statutes, which
had such a vogue a few years ago, involves one method of interference with surface waters, but since the damages incident to
the construction have been assessed against benefited property and
paid to the injured parties as part of the statutory proceedings,
tortious interferences have been confined largely to subsequent
interferences with the drainage system established through the
ditch proceedings. As a matter of fact when a county constructs
a ditch at the instance of petitioning landowners, it is not liable
for damages caused by the interferences thus made with the
existing drainage system. The landowner's opportunity for redress
is limited to the method of ascertaining damages under the statute,
and he cannot obtain compensation by bringing action against the
county. 760 Once established, drainage systems may not be inter-

fered with any more than any natural system of surface drainage.
A town that does so, like an individual, is subject to liability
for the consequent flooding of private land. 7 1' The ordinary rules
70 2
governing interferences with surface waters apply in such cases.
75sSandmeier v. Town of St. James, (1925) 165 Minn. 34, 205 N. W.
634. In Bush v. City of Rochester, (1934) 191 Minn. 591, 255 N. W. 256,
Chief Justice Devaney's opinion pointed out that in Sheehan v. Flynn, "the
phrase 'reasonable care' is sometimes used where obviously 'reasonable use'
is intended."
759(1887) 36 Minn. 373, 31 N. W. 863, 1 Am. St. Rep. 671.
,60 Defiel v. County of Clay, (1926) 169 Minn. 79, 210 N. W. 626.
See also Gaare v. Board of County Commissioners, (1903) 90 Minn. 530,
97 N.61W. 422.
7 Olson v. County of Roseau, (1925) 164 Minn. 452, 205 N. W.
372; Felepe v. Towns of America and Cedarbend, (1928) 174 Minn. 317,
219 N. W. 158.
' 62 See, in addition to the cases cited in the preceding note, Reed v.
Board of Park Commissioners, (1907) 100 Minn. 167, 110 N. W. 1119;
Rasmussen v. Town of Hutchinson, (1910) 111 Minn. 457, 127 N. W. 182.
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b. OBsTRUcTioN OF NATURAL WATERCOURSES
Probably the same rule of reasonable use applies to interferences with natural watercourses as with surface waters in
Minnesota.76 3 Apparently, as in the case of surface waters, the
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is
not applied in such cases, and liability is imposed in the same
situations as those in which a private individual would be held
liable.7

64

2.

OTHER TORTS

While there have been a few hints at some difference in lia-

bility of a municipality between an act of negligence and an
"active, affirmative tort," ' 5 it seems clear that the court holds
crucial the distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions in actions arising out of assault and battery, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and like torts."o Whether or
not there are any municipal torts other than invasion of interests
in land to which the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions does not apply appears never to have been
763

Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, (1883) 30 Minn. 249, 15 N. WV.
167, 44 Am. Rep. 194; Pinney v. Luce, (1890) 44 Minn. 367, 46 N. V.
561; Minnesota Loan and Trust Co. v. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power
Co., (1901) 82 Minn. 505, 85 N. W. 520. This question is discussed in
Kinyon and McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, (1940) 24 MINESOTA LAW REvwxw 891, 892. These authors argue that all invasions
of a possessor's interests in the use and enjoyment of his land should be
treated as different phases of a single problem involving the application
of the same fundamental principles, irrespective of the medium through
which the invasions are caused. Only in New Hampshire, and possibly
Minnesota, is this the case. Idem, pp. 892-893.
76
4See Schussler" v. Board of Commissioners of Hennepin County,
(1897) 67 Minn. 412, 70 N. V. 6; Cf. Erickson v. County of Stearns,
(1934) 190 Minn. 433, 252 N. WV.219. See also Biron v. Board of Water
Commissioners of St. Paul, (1889) 41 Minn. 519, 43 N. V. 482, where a
proprietary function was involved. The case turned on a point of pleading.
76 5
See Schussler v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Hennepin County,
(1897) 67 Minn. 412, 416, 70 N. XV. 6.
76 6
Lamont v. Stavanaugh, (1915) 129 Minn. 321, 152 N. V. 72;
Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District, (1938) 201 Minn. 622.
277. N. W. 208. Other cases have indicated that the inmmnity in connection with the exercise of a governmental function extends beyond purely
negligent torts. See Gullikson v. McDonald, (1895) 62 Minn. 278, 64
N. W. 812, where the court held a municipality was exempt from liability
for damages resulting from wrongful acts of a police officer in making
arrests or detailing prisoners; and Grube v. City of St. Paul, (1886) 34
Minn. 402, 26 N. IV. 229, where it was said that a municipality is not
liable for damages resulting from the "acts or misconduct" of its firemen.
Elsewhere these acts have been treated like those based on negligence.
Moss v. City of Augusta (1894) 93 Ga. 797, 20 S. E. 653; Brown v. Town
of Eustis, (1926) 92 Fla. 931, 110 So. 873; City of Lawton v. Harkins.
(1912) 34 Okla. 545, 126 Pac. 727; Tzatzken v. City of Detroit, (1924)
226 Mich. 603, 198 N. W. 214.
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expressly determined by the Minnesota court. On principle, it
seems difficult to differentiate such torts as fraud, duress, or deceit
from assault and battery and torts involving negligence; the
reasons given for the immunity of the municipality in carrying
on governmental functions are equally cogent in both cases.
Fraud or duress may constitute a tort if it results in the
invasion of a possessory or proprietary interest.-", The liability of
a municipal corporation or quasi-municipal corporation for these
torts in Minnesota remains somewhat clouded in doubt because
there have been no cases directly on the point."'
There is a dearth of authority on the question of ex delicto
liability of a municipality for deceit; but a dictum in one case
from another jurisdiction states that a city is not liable for
deceit arising from a transaction involving the performance of a
governmental function 0 9 Perhaps the reason for the scarcity
of such decisions is that because of the peculiar nature of the
liability imposed for deceit, under which an action ex contractu
is permitted in cases where misrepresentation is associated with
a contract, 770 there is an easy means of avoiding the traditional
limitations on a municipal corporation's tort liability.jll
The Minnesota court has expressly left open the question of
liability of a political subdivision of the state for fraud or
fraudulent concealment. 7 2 Reference in that case, involving a
767
Restatement on Torts, sec. 871, Comments e, f; (1935) 39 Harv.

L. Rev.
108.
7 68
No distinction has been drawn between the two types of political
subdivisions with regard to restitution of taxes or other contributions paid
tinder coercion. Restatement on Restitution, sec. 75. This is, however, a
subject beyond the scope of this study. The only case remotely relevant on
the question of liability for duress appears to be Flanigan v. City of Minneapolis, (1887) 36 Minn. 406, 31 N. W. 863. There the plaintiffs had
become sureties on the bond of a man arraigned in the Minneapolis municipal court for a felony. The accused failed to appear. Plaintiffs alleged
that the chief of police threatened to take them into custody and conducted
them before the municipal court clerk who demanded the money due on
the bond. They paid it and then stied for its recovery on the ground of
duress. Finding that there was no duress and that the clerk was a proper
person to receive the money, the court held that the defendant's demurrer
should have been sustained. There is nothing in the decision to indicate
what the outcome would have been if there had been duress.
769Waisman
v. Wagner, (1938) 227 Wis. 193, 278 N. W. 418.
770
The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions does
not apply to contract cases of this kind. Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester County, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1938), 94 F. (2d) 580, certiorari denied,
(1938) 304 U. S. 561, 58 Sup. Ct. 943, 82 L. Ed. 1528. Cf. Sundeen v.
County of Ramsey, (1910) 109 Minn. 505, 124 N. W. 243.
771(1939) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 808.
T72Township of Normania v. County of Yellow Medicine. (1935) 205
Minn. 451. 286 N. W. 881.
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town, to an Indiana decision 7 3 which assumed that a city would
be subject to liability where there had been some affirmative act
or conduct and not mere silence, may imply, perhaps, that whatever the rule eventually adopted, it is likely to apply equally to
cities and villages and to quasi municipal corporations.(To be continued.)
773
Churchman
77

v. City of Indianapolis, (1887) 110 Ind. 259, 11 N. E. 301.
4While not a case of fraud or duress, the case of Bass v. City of
Shakopee, (1880) 27 Minn. 250, 4 N. V. 619, 6 N. W. 776, involving contempt, may be of interest here. There the city had been enjoined from proceeding to enter upon the plaintiff's land to remove earth and trees in
building a highway. An order was later made suspending the injunction
until the hearing and determination of a motion to dissolve it. The plaintiff claimed that the city disobeyed the injunction, was in contempt and
therefore could not be heard. This objection was overruled and the injunction was dissolved. On the plaintiff's appeal, the court held that a municipal corporation could not be guilty of contempt in disobeying an injunction. The contempt if any was held to be that of individual persons, as for
instance officers of the corporation. Perhaps the basis for immunity here is
similar to that in criminal cases; municipalities probably cannot be held
guilty of crimes unless the statutes provide so quite expressly. See Barnett,
Criminal Liability of American Municipal Corporations, (1938) 17 Or. L.
Rev. 289-306. Professor Barnett found that the criminal liability of quasi
municipal corporations had been assumed or expressly declared in American
cases beginning in an early day, although there wvas practically no discussion of principles involved and few references to English precedents. Ideni,
pp. 296-297. An early Minnesota case implied that indictment would lie
against a town for failure to keep its roads in good repair. Altnow v. Town
of Sibley, (1883) 30 Minn. 186, 198, 14 N. W. 877.

